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Abstract and caveat from the authors 
On 17 September 2010, the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), 
Leiden University and ICCO organised an expert meeting at the ISS on 
universal jurisdiction (UJ). The meeting was chaired in the morning by 
Professor John Dugard1 and in the afternoon by Professor Karin Arts2. The 
aim of the meeting was to analyse the possibilities and challenges faced in 
universal jurisdiction cases, and more broadly, the capacity of national legal 
jurisdictions to prosecute and/or otherwise hold accountable individuals and 
companies for (complicity in) international crimes. To that end, the meeting 
brought together academics and practitioners who have been working in the 
area of international criminal law and individual and corporate accountability. 
 This policy paper is a report of the September 2010 meeting, which 
consisted of two sessions. The morning session covered Dutch jurisprudence 
concerning universal jurisdiction and focussed on specific cases. The afternoon 
session highlighted political and social themes and took a more comparative 
approach. Although the outcomes of the meeting were embedded in the Dutch 
context, they also reached out to other jurisdictions. 
 We wish to add a caveat that this policy paper is very much work-in-
progress and draws on our personal reflections and impressions from this 
meeting. It is by no means intended as a verbatim record of the meeting. This 
policy brief is intended to stimulate critical discussion on this important issue 
and therefore no attribution should be implied or assumed on the part of 
any contributor to this report or the institutions they are affiliated with, 
including the principal contributors. We nevertheless welcome your feedback 
and further contributions. 
Keywords 
International criminal law, universal jurisdiction, human rights, politics of 
international law. 
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Universal Jurisdiction: State of Affairs and Ways Ahead 
A policy paper 
1 Universal Jurisdiction Cases in The Netherlands 
1.1 Early cases: retroactive application of universal 
jurisdiction? 
At the expert seminar organised at the ISS on 17 September 2010, Richard van 
Elst3 presented an overview of the first Dutch cases, including an important 
case against Desi Bouterse, which was initiated by relatives of the victims of 
the December killings which occurred in 1982 in Suriname (Zegveld 2001). 
The Dutch public prosecutor declined to initiate criminal proceedings against 
Bouterse and subsequently, these relatives addressed the Amsterdam Appeals 
Court in a procedure provided for in article 12 of the Dutch Code of Criminal 
Procedure.  
According to van Elst, the only jurisdictional ground available to the 
Appeals Court was universal jurisdiction. The Appeals Court addressed the 
question whether customary international law, as it existed in 1982, gave the 
Netherlands competence over a foreign person accused of torture or crimes 
against humanity committed abroad. The appeals court of Amsterdam 
answered this question affirmatively and ordered the public prosecutor to 
prosecute the head of state for the December killings. This decision was 
unique and far-reaching; until then no criminal proceedings had been initiated 
before Dutch courts on the basis of universal jurisdiction. 
The Attorney General brought the Bouterse case before the Supreme 
Court. He addressed five legal questions, all from an international law point of 
view. The Supreme Court, however, took a national approach to each of the 
five questions. It was striking to note that, apart from citations of the UN 
Torture Convention 1984, the Supreme Court addressed no international 
obligation.  
After the Supreme Court decision in the Bouterse case, plaintiffs in the 
criminal complaint against Jorge Zorreguieta focused on the responsibility of 
the latter for crimes against humanity, allegedly committed in Argentina 
between 1976 and 1983 while serving as a member of the cabinet of President 
Videla. However, as neither treaties nor decisions of international 
organizations (among which the Charter of the Nuremberg tribunal) referred 
to universal jurisdiction, the Appeals Court stated that it was not at liberty to 
set aside the national provisions on jurisdiction in case of a conflict with 
(unwritten) customary international law. In so deciding, the Appeal Court again 
took a strict, national approach in answering the question of jurisdiction. 
The outcome of the Bouterse and Zorreguieta cases is that the legality 
principle bars retroactive application of any provision on jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, treaty-based universal jurisdiction cannot be applied directly.  
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1.2 Cases where the defendant was present 
All successful prosecutions in the Netherlands concerned suspects who lived in 
the Netherlands at the time of the start of the criminal investigation. Some of 
the suspects were Dutch; some were not. All of the suspects had their habitat 
(legal residence) in the Netherlands. 
Larissa van den Herik4 discussed cases prosecuted in the Netherlands on the 
basis of the active personality principle. The exercise of extraterritorial criminal 
acceptance on the basis of the active personality principle has greater 
acceptance in public international law than the application of universal 
jurisdiction. The active personality principle has a much longer history and, 
until the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, it was the most commonly used 
jurisdiction principle. While rarely being exercised today, the principle 
reappears at the international stage, at least where international crimes are 
concerned.  
The inherent intricacies of cases based on either principle (universal 
jurisdiction or the active personality principle) are to a large extent comparable 
in character. In particular, both principles involve the collection of evidence 
abroad and the required legal assistance to do so, as well as the increased 
complexity for judges to come to a sound assessment of the facts, given that 
the alleged crimes were committed in a different geographical, social and 
cultural context.  
The case against Guus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch businessman charged 
among others for war crimes committed in early 2000 in Liberia, is a very clear 
illustration of the difficulties involved regarding the collection of evidence and 
mutual legal assistance, and the increased complexity for judges and other 
actors involved to form a judgment on the facts.  
Regarding war crimes, attention should be drawn to the fact that, under 
Dutch law, every violation of the laws and customs of war can, in principle, 
amount to a war crime. However, it is questionable whether the Netherlands 
can indeed exercise universal jurisdiction for violations of international 
humanitarian law that are not recognized as war crimes at the international 
level. In the Mpambara judgment, the Hague Court of First Instance 
acknowledged the importance of international penalization. With reference to 
the Tadic-criteria, the Hague Court ruled that Dutch courts can only exercise 
universal jurisdiction for a violation of IHL if international individual criminal 
responsibility exist in relation to the given violation.  
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1.3 Cases where the defendant was only briefly present  
Under the Dutch International Crimes Act (WIM), presence on home territory 
is a condition for jurisdiction of the national courts, if neither the suspect nor 
the victims are Dutch. So, one could question whether true universal 
jurisdiction in fact exists, as a link with the Netherlands is always required. This 
may not be a bad thing. The Netherlands cannot realistically be expected to try 
international crimes where it has no relationship whatsoever with these crimes.  
The main issue faced in this context is in the definition of the word 
presence. How long must the presence be and for what kind of jurisdiction 
presence is a precondition? Liesbeth Zegveld discussed this question on the basis 
of the case against Ayalon.  
From 16 to 20 May 2008, the former director of Shin Bet, the Israeli 
General Security Services, in 1999 and 2000, Ami Ayalon, was visiting the 
Netherlands. At the time of his visit, Ayalon was Minister without Portfolio in 
the Israeli Government. On 16 May 2008, an application for the arrest of Ami 
Ayalon was filed for alleged torture in relation to his former position as 
Director of Shin Bet.  
The Dutch authorities failed to arrest Mr Ayalon. Once Ayalon had left 
the Netherlands, the prosecutor decided not to start a prosecution, as Ayalon 
was no longer present on Dutch territory. The decision not to prosecute 
Ayalon was subsequently the subject of a legal challenge in the Court of 
Appeal in The Hague. An Order was sought requiring a criminal investigation, 
supported by an extradition request or an international arrest warrant. Central 
to the case before the Court of Appeal was the question of whether Ayalon’s 
presence, however brief, provided the Dutch prosecutor with jurisdiction to 
investigate the case, and possibly arrest Ayalon.  
Unfortunately, Zegveld argued, the ruling of the Court of Appeal was 
confusing (Handmaker 2010). On the one hand, the Court ruled that presence 
was indeed a sufficient precondition for jurisdiction. On the other hand, it 
ruled that presence in and of itself did not actually establish or activate 
jurisdiction. In the view of the Court, a particular action of the prosecutor was 
needed in order to activate such jurisdiction. In the particular case of Ayalon, 
such action by the prosecutor was required because, according to the Court, 
the file lacked sufficient evidence against Ayalon. A prima facie case was thus, in 
the view of the court, required for jurisdiction to exist. 
The puzzling decision of the Court made jurisdiction dependent on a 
sufficient degree of suspicion against the alleged perpetrator. In deciding so, 
the Court confused jurisdiction with substantive suspicions against a person. 
However, jurisdiction is based on the law and independent of any action of the 
prosecutor (or anyone else for that matter). The presence of the offender – 
however brief – should have triggered jurisdiction and allowed the Dutch 
prosecutor to investigate the case, to establish guilt, and possibly to arrest the 
suspect. 
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Considerable confusion has surrounded this topic. Legislators and courts 
often do not specify the precise temporal moment at which any requirement of 
jurisdiction is supposed to be applicable. Is the presence of the accused within 
a state required at the time the complaint is issued? Is the presence of the 
accused required at the time of the decision to prosecute is taken; or at the 
time of the actual prosecution; or at the time of the actual trial? Unfortunately, 
the Court of Appeal missed a unique opportunity to clarify the unclear rules 
and practice on presence of alleged perpetrators on Dutch territory. 
According to the Dutch Court in the Ayalon case, there was no 
jurisdiction for the Dutch prosecutor since there was felt to be insufficient 
evidence against the accused. But, how can there ever be a prima facie case if the 
prosecutor is denied jurisdiction to investigate a case in the first place? In order 
to establish a prima facie case, which is the duty of the prosecutor rather than of 
the victim, the prosecutor needs jurisdiction. The only reasonable conclusion 
can be that the existence of a prima facie case is irrelevant for the concept of 
jurisdiction.  
In the case of Ayalon, the Court of Appeal took a step backwards in 
clarifying the rules on jurisdiction over perpetrators present on Dutch territory. 
According to Dutch law, presence provides the Dutch authorities with 
jurisdiction to start investigation of a case, for example pursuant to a complaint 
by one of the alleged victims. Presence is fulfilled even during a stopover 
during a flight or a brief visit. Furthermore, jurisdiction continues to exist 
when the alleged perpetrator has left the country. Would the situation be 
otherwise, then there would be an incentive for prosecutors to allow a suspect, 
against whom a complaint has been filed by victims, to depart Dutch territory, 
so as to be able to claim that the prosecutor lacks jurisdiction. 
1.4 Further analysis of Dutch universal jurisdiction cases 
André Klip5 presented a further analysis of universal jurisdiction cases in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands has been extraordinary in its practice on 
universal jurisdiction (Klip and Sluiter 1999-2007). The focus has been on 
asylum seekers, making use of article 1F of the Refugee Convention that 
excludes individual asylum seekers from enjoying refuge protection if there are 
serious reasons for believing that they were involved in international crimes. 
Furthermore, there is a focus in The Netherlands on promoting clean business by 
Dutch nationals (e.g. Van Anraat and Kouwenhoven). 
How is it possible to improve the Dutch approach of jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial offences? Klip noted that universal jurisdiction created a 
bystanders effect: everyone is responsible so no one is responsible. States do 
not make friends when they prosecute international crimes.  
A better term to refer to universal jurisdiction would be decentralized 
enforcement of international law. Most international law is enforced through the 
national courts. Moreover, the starting point should be criminality, not 
jurisdiction. Klip recommended organizing the provisions on jurisdiction in 
such a way that an adequate balance is found between the link with the act and 
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the seriousness of the act. In case of serious crimes, the link needs to be less 
close. 
Another problem was selectivity: which cases are picked up and why? It 
would be better to appoint states on the basis of a shared responsibility model. 
Such a model would, for example, have helped the ICTY with referrals of 
cases. The costs and benefits of prosecuting alleged offenders would then also 
be in balance. Current practice has led to a symbolic, handful of cases. In order 
to advance such prosecutions, Klip argued, the establishment of an 
international body competent to oversee national enforcement of international 
crimes should be considered. 
In addition, the provision of trained personnel and adequate funding is 
more important than the jurisdictional principle. What is decisive is not the 
jurisdiction over such cases, but the allocation of resources to the criminal 
justice system. Klip recommended adjusting the jurisdictional provisions to the 
capacity to investigate, prosecute and to try cases that are available. The 
capacity to investigate, prosecute and try also needed to be adjusted to the 
scope of Dutch criminal law. 
1.5 Closing comments from the session 
Participants stressed that there are many different grounds for the Dutch 
Courts to claim jurisdiction over international crimes, but relies in all instances 
on a (political) decision to prosecute by the office of the public prosecutor. 
Greater efficiency / co-ordination is needed between the judiciary in different 
countries, on the basis of particular expertise in adjudicating particular types of 
crimes, or in relation to conflicts / situations in specific countries. Finally, it 
was noted that, according to Article 93 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, states 
and the international court have an obligation to prosecute. What happens in 
government, however, is a reflection of what happens in the streets; in other 
words, social movements and other civic pressures towards the prosecution of 
international crimes will push the political.  
With these additional comments, Professor Dugard drew the morning 
session to a close and introduced the afternoon session by underlining that 
international law does not prohibit absolute universal jurisdiction, but that 
some states (Ed: for political reasons) are more inclined to pursue this than 
others. For example, in South Africa, attempts have been made to investigate 
alleged crimes in the aftermath of the Gaza conflict after Israeli soldiers 
boasted about their experiences on the social networking website Facebook. 
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2 Social and Political Challenges in Pursuing UJ Cases 
This section presents the content of discussion that took place in the afternoon 
session of the 17 September 2010 meeting on various means to hold 
individuals and, potentially, also corporations accountable at a national level 
(c.f. Cernic and Van den Herik 2010). Firstly, as discussed in the morning 
session, it is possible to prosecute an individual or a corporation and/or the 
management of that corporation in the criminal courts, for example in terms of 
the Dutch law on international crimes. Second, it is possible to pursue a civil 
case against an individual or a corporation, for example in terms of the Aliens 
Torts Compensation Act (ATCA) in the USA. Third, it is possible for a Court 
to review a decision, or failure by a government to take action (i.e. to regulate) 
in respect of the behaviour by an individual or a corporation. For example, it is 
possible in some countries to judicially review the failure of a government to 
regulate the behaviour of corporations that are complicit in the commission of 
war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law. 
2.1 A critical analysis of universal jurisdiction 
Kate Maynard6 presented an overview of her law firm’s experience in bringing 
universal jurisdiction cases to the attention of the British prosecutors 
(Machover and Maynard 2006). Up until recently, there have been broad 
possibilities for bringing such cases to the courts. However, proposed changes 
to the UK law would require the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions in the case of those who possessed diplomatic immunity. 
Maynard outlined the process by which UJ cases are brought. After 
establishing the legislative basis for bringing such a case, lawyers then examine 
whether sufficient evidence for proving an international crime exists. If these 
criteria are satisfied, then the matter is brought to the attention of the police. If 
an alleged individual is expected to travel to the UK then an arrest warrant is 
sought by the lawyers; alternatively, a request is made for a preliminary 
investigation in preparation for an eventual arrest. There is no dedicated police 
unit in the UK to handle such cases. 
The next stage is to approach the Magistrate Court. If the Court issues a 
warrant, then the matter goes back to the police. Maynard noted that there is a 
general reluctance amongst UK Magistrates to issue such a warrant and these 
kinds of cases are accorded a low priority among prosecutors as well (Ibid). If, 
however, a warrant is issued, then the suspect is put on a watch list at all UK 
airports. Cases can, therefore, be prepared long in advance of an alleged 
perpetrator of international crimes. However, there is an additional tension as 
well, namely between immigration authorities and prosecuting authorities, 
which do not co-ordinate with each other very well; the former inclined to 
reject entry to such individuals, the latter inclined to admit entry to such 
individuals for the purposes of prosecution or eventual extradition. 
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2.2 Corporate accountability 
Amsterdam-based attorney Phon van den Biesen7 continued the discussion with a 
focus on civil litigation to address the responsibilities of corporations in 
relation to international crimes. He stressed that international obligations not 
to be party to international crimes are not the sole prerogative of states, but 
also of individuals and corporate legal persons, but also that this is only a 
partial remedy and that compensation for damages inflicted and orders 
banning future violations are also important, and universally accepted aspects 
of any system aiming for the adjudication of justice. 
Litigating such cases is far less an academic/ legal exercise than a matter of 
gathering solid evidence. This being said, legal barriers for pursuing cases 
against corporations do exist, notably the political questions doctrine that 
argues such cases should not run counter to domestic interests. However, this 
doctrine has been subject to legal challenge and in 1984, in the Cruise Missiles 
case the Court of Appeal reversed the doctrine (i.e. there were higher interests 
at stake). These arguments were rejected by the International Court of Justice 
in both its Advisory Opinion regarding Nuclear Weapons (ICJ 1996) and in a 
later Advisory Opinion regarding the construction of the Israeli Wall (ICJ 
2004). 
A Dutch Civil Society Organization could consider to  institute civil law 
proceedings before a Dutch Court of law against, for example, a Dutch 
Company that provides the Israeli Government with bricks and concrete to 
assist with the construction of the Wall, or against a Dutch Timber Company 
that imports illegally harvested timber from the Congo into the Netherlands, or 
against a Dutch Retailer that sells products produced in South East Asia which 
products have been put together by children no older than 10 years old. 
However, there is a lack of available Dutch case law on this type of litigation. 
Assuming that the defendant companies in these examples each have their 
seat in the Netherlands, the Court in which district the seat is located will, in 
principle, have jurisdiction. In some circumstances it is also possible for a 
Dutch Court to have jurisdiction if the seat of the companies would not be in 
the Netherlands. A Dutch Civil Society Organisation would potentially have 
standing. 
The remedy sought could be (1) a declaratory judgement establishing that a 
certain behaviour or a lack of a certain behaviour constituted a tortuous 
behaviour towards the plaintiff; (2) a mandatory judgement ordering the defendant 
to take certain steps and/or to refrain from others, which decision may be 
secured by a substantial fine for not implementing this decision or (3) a 
judgement ordering the defendant to publish the judgement holding one of or 
a combination of the two previous sorts of judgements. Obviously, variants of 
these judgements would depend on the specifics of a particular case. 
The next challenge is deciding what type of law to apply (i.e. that the acts 
were committed in such a way as to have been tortuous had they committed in 
the Netherlands. For example, if a Dutch arms trader ordered the production 
of certain rockets in the Netherlands in order to sell those to a Government 
which was using these rockets to commit genocide on an ethnic minority in 
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that country, it is clear that the acts committed by the Dutch trader would fall 
squarely under Dutch tort law since they qualify as complicity to genocide. 
As the Dutch law is far from clear, human rights law and international 
humanitarian law could help bridge the gap. As far as human rights law is 
concerned, by now it may be assumed that this body of law is applied as part 
of Dutch law, whether directly or indirectly. Horizontal application of these 
fundamental human rights norms does occur directly, but also indirectly 
through the general notion of tort law; the tort-law norm prohibiting to act in 
violation of, what is called, proper social conduct, being the norm that may be 
interpreted through the very substance of human rights norms. Most of the 
case law between natural and legal persons in this respect is developed under 
Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. This case law demonstrates that a Dutch corporation 
may be held accountable for tortuous acts committed against individual 
citizens.  
A more complicated situation arises when acts are committed on non-
Dutch territory against non-Dutch citizens. Support for the application of 
human rights law as part of the foreign national law may be found in case law 
developed under the European Human Rights Convention, but universal 
application is still some way off. 
This brings us back to the 80% of the job that needs to be done in any 
sort of litigation: getting the facts straight, providing indispensable evidence 
and establishing causation. The task that we are facing definitely is not easy, 
not from the legal point of view nor from the practical point of view. 
2.3 The politics and social challenges of international justice 
Jeff Handmaker argued that the purpose and nature of legal claims ought not to 
be taken for granted. As Mutua has noted, the notion of universal jurisdiction, 
similar to most supranational legal principles, is not a natural phenomenon; it 
is constructed and in fact rarely regarded as universal, although it has the 
potential to be (Mutua 2010). This doesn’t mean that one shouldn’t support 
the principle of universal jurisdiction. But, in doing so, one must be conscious 
of the social, political, cultural and historical circumstances in which universal 
jurisdiction is exercised, if only for the sake of advancing a solid jurisprudence. 
Mutua insists that ‘we must ask ourselves the purposes that such a process (as 
UJ) will serve’, namely: (1) vindication of the rule of law; (2) 
modifying/deterring behaviour or (3) creating a jurisprudence to judge, 
regulate and refine conduct. 
In other words, UJ is part of broader, extra-territorial efforts to find 
jurisdiction against crimes that shock the conscience of humankind, always aimed at 
the state, and framed in terms of direct and indirect claims. Direct claims by 
civic actors confront a state with its international obligations, insisting that 
states take action and generating a range of responses, either against 
individuals/corporations within their jurisdiction, or against other states. 
However, such claims involve a high degree of political will and so most 
claims by civic actors are indirect, in other words indirectly addressing state 
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accountability through an individual or corporate agent. This means that either: 
criminal claims aimed at individual or corporate perpetrators who were agents 
of a state or civil claims aim at individuals and corporations who have been 
active or complicit in gross violations of human rights, war crimes or crimes 
against humanity. 
As Van den Biesen noted, the principal challenges faced by these 
different kinds of claims are mostly practical in nature, not only in terms of 
gathering, but also assessing evidence in the absence of expert knowledge of 
another country’s society, political and cultural system. This is in addition to 
the legal challenges faced, whether in piercing the corporate veil, shielding 
oneself through claims of immunity, which may be misplaced or exaggerated 
or requiring the presence of the accused on the territory of a country where a 
claim is made. However, of utmost concern, Handmaker argued, is the 
selective – and highly politicised – manner in which the law is applied, 
depending on the country where the alleged perpetrator is from, as illustrated 
in the Netherlands in the complaint against Ayalon. 
Sarah Nouwen8 distinguished international justice done by international 
criminal justice institutions from universal jurisdiction exercised by national 
courts. She identified at least three possible advantages of the latter over the 
former. First, she identified the right to a fair trial, observing that international 
criminal tribunals present themselves as paragons of human rights protection. 
However, in various aspects, including the duration of trials, equality of arms 
between the prosecutor and defense, and a pressure to convict, she argued 
that the states currently exercising universal jurisdiction tend to have higher 
standards in relation to a fair trial than international tribunals. Secondly, 
universal jurisdiction is often exercised only if the suspect is on the territory of 
the state concerned, making it more realistic that court orders, including arrest 
warrants, are enforced. International tribunals, by contrast, have no 
enforcement powers, making them more dependent on cooperation from 
states and are thereby more vulnerable to political influence from 
governments. Finally, in the case of universal jurisdiction, there is some degree 
of political oversight, including checks and balances, and in the countries in 
which it is currently being exercised this oversight is even relatively 
democratic. Many consider political oversight a disadvantage, arguing that on 
this point international tribunals do better because of the ‘independent’ 
prosecutor. However, political considerations are a fact, both in domestic 
universal jurisdiction proceedings and in international tribunals. The 
difference is that in domestic justice systems someone is ultimately 
accountable (e.g. a Minister of Justice), whereas in international tribunals the 
political dimension is denied and, in practice, no one is accountable for the 
actions of the prosecutor. 
Nouwen then turned her attention to some problematic features that 
universal jurisdiction and international tribunals share, as part of the 
‘international justice project’. The first is, she argued, the doubtful basis of the 
right to exercise jurisdiction. She conceded that one can find bases in 
international legal instruments and customary international law. The deeper 
justification for universal jurisdiction, and thus for these instruments, is often 
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that these crimes have been committed ‘against humanity’ and that all are 
therefore victimised and have a right to punish. But, what is the relationship 
between the physical victim, the directly victimised society and the 
‘international community’? Is the right to punish on the part of the 
international community stronger than, for instance, the direct victim or his or 
her society’s right to forgive, if that is the individual’s wish or part of the 
concerned country’s transitional-justice policy? Is the international right 
stronger, even if international punitive justice threatens a country’s transition, 
the consequences of which are felt more directly by the victim and victimised 
society than the ‘international community’? The second problematic feature 
raised by Nouwen is the way in which the international justice movement 
monopolises the rich term ‘international justice’ for the narrow project of the 
application and enforcement, whether through international tribunals or 
universal jurisdiction, of international criminal law. This body of law focuses 
on a few visible crimes that can be reduced to the agency of a view individuals. 
International justice, in this sense, does not speak out regarding the 
international injustices of inequality and poverty, the causes of which are to a 
large extent located in the structure of the same international community in 
whose name international justice is performed. The problem is not, Nouwen 
argued, that these injustices are not covered by international criminal law. The 
problem is that retributive justice for a few individuals has usurped the 
attention and resources necessary for the fostering of agency and for the 
realization of a broader vision of justice, one that entails restorative and, even 
more necessary, distributive justice.  
2.4 Additional comments from the session 
Additional interventions from the participants stressed the role of activists and 
broader civic efforts / social movements aimed at ending impunity for 
international crimes. While some governments show a willingness to prosecute 
these crimes, others see this as a ‘problem’ and even advising their nationals / 
soldiers not to travel abroad. What is very clear, however, is that the issue is 
firmly in the public debate and irrespective of the legal outcome of a particular 
case, the campaigns to end impunity for international crimes continue. 
Professor Susan Akram9 explained in some detail the situation in the 
United States. The US is party to five treaties that relate to universal 
jurisdiction and has a robust (civil) tort legislation that permits a broad remit to 
seek and hold individuals and corporations accountable for international 
crimes. However, treaties in the US are not self-executing and there is a general 
reluctance towards situations from particular countries / regions, not least with 
regard to complaints from Palestinians. In other words, there is a clear 
selectivity in the choice of cases that are heard, let alone prosecuted or 
adjudicated. Various other legal obstacles include: (1) sovereign immunity, which 
applies in some cases even after retirement and is even applicable to the 
diplomats of some countries, such as Israel and (2) the political questions doctrine, 
which assumes that such cases are not an appropriate matter for the courts, but 
for the executive or legislature. 
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3 Concluding Remarks 
Universal jurisdiction and broader legal efforts aimed at ending impunity for 
international crimes is still a relatively new area of the law, although there have 
been notable developments in recent years. National courts are now regularly 
hearing cases on universal jurisdiction. These factors compelled us to critically 
assess where things stood at this particular juncture although the relative 
newness of this issues means that any discussion on this topic should be very 
much be considered as work-in-progress. This policy brief aims to inform this 
discussion. 
There are promising examples of cases prosecuted on the basis of active 
nationality principle, or cases where the suspect has his permanent habitat in 
the Netherlands.  
There may be good reasons to choose cases based on the grave breaches 
laid down in the 1949 Geneva Conventions as these rules are widely respected. 
However, there are also many other international crimes of grave concern, not 
least torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, as well as 
piracy and acts of terrorism, genocide and even the crime of apartheid. The 
term universal jurisdiction may therefore be rightly replaced by ‘international 
law enforcement’, so as to put the emphasis on the applicable material rules 
that are sought to be enforced. 
The Netherlands practice has shown that the presence of the suspect is a 
prerequisite either in order to investigate or to prosecute, a necessary 
condition. But, it is also clear in the state practice from other countries (e.g. the 
United Kingdom and South Africa) that this should not be regarded as a 
necessary condition, at least not always. 
Beyond legal considerations in pursuing cases against individuals and 
corporations, the complex social and political considerations surrounding such 
cases suggest that they are a form of ‘politics by other means’ (Abel 1995). This 
does not necessarily imply that lawyers should actively engage in political 
debates, but in light of the above, it does mean that lawyers be acutely 
conscious of the need for consistency and evenhandedness. Lawyers have 
operated in a ‘narrow, but significant space’ that is defined by state interests 
and conditioned by structural constraints, but lawyers can derive authority 
from both national and international obligations to investigate and prosecute. 
As such, it is important neither to under-estimate the potential of law to deliver 
justice and promote an end to impunity, nor to over-exaggerate its effects. In 
other words, lawyers must also think strategically.  
In a related way, law can be used to enhance other forms of advocacy, 
strengthening civic campaigns and providing legal backing for states to take 
action against other states, individuals and corporations. As Larissa van den 
Herik noted: ‘States have a direct interest in regulating and adjudicating the 
behaviour of their own nationals’ (Van den Herik 2009: 225).  
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3.1 Recommendations 
While the decision to prosecute in The Netherlands will in most cases also be 
political, a number of factors can help reduce the arbitrariness of the 
international justice system. These include: 
(1) clear policies concerning the investigation and prosecution of alleged 
individuals and corporations ought to be in place; 
(2) training of judicial staff members and prosecutors, particularly in the 
area of cross-cultural issues on gathering and assessing evidence, and 
the provision of adequate resources is needed; 
(3) trans-judicial communication between the international tribunals / 
courts and national courts, which could assist in promoting more uni-
versal standards; and 
(4)  collaboration with experts who have specific knowledge of a country’s 
social, cultural and political context.  
In this way, law and other forms of advocacy can build in a cumulative 
and deliberate way to strengthen both legal and political mechanisms to 
investigate, prosecute and adjudicate international crimes in a consistent and 
even-handed manner, as part of a genuinely universal effort to end impunity. 
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